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Pride and ‘Prejudice to the Environment’: An 
Application of TRIPS Article 27.2 to Genetically 
Modified Seeds
“Where there is a real superiority of mind, pride will be always under 
good regulation.”1
- JANE AUSTEN
INTRODUCTION
In the small village of Capulalpan, located in the foothills of the 
Mexican state of Oaxaca, production of native corn varieties is an 
important cultural activity.2 Around the turn of the century, village elders 
discovered a wild strain of corn that was invading their native “Creole”
crops.3 Though it has been illegal since 1998 to cultivate genetically 
modified (GM) corn within Mexico, the country still imports GM corn for 
human consumption.4 Biologists tested the DNA5 of this wild strain in 
2002 and discovered it was genetically modified.6 Genetically altered corn 
had been delivered to villages on trucks, so the natives assumed that 
kernels fell off the trucks during their journey and started to grow 
wherever they landed.7 The GM corn quickly took over the native crops. 
According to Antonio Serratos of the Mexico-based International Center 
for the Improvement of Maize and Wheat, if a farmer with a one-hectare8
plot plants a single row with this invasive GM seed, sixty-five percent of 
the plot will be GM in only seven years.9 Though the genetically modified 
corn grew larger and quicker than the native varieties, it was highly 
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1. JANE AUSTEN, PRIDE AND PREJUDICE (1813).
2. Carmelo Ruiz-Marrero, Genetic Pollution: Biotech Corn Invades Mexico,
CORP WATCH (Mar. 20, 2002), https://perma.cc/JNV8-Y234.
3. Pav Jordan, Mysterious ‘Alien’ Corn Invades Mexico Countryside, INST.
FOR AGRIC. & TRADE POL’Y (Jan. 30, 2002), https://perma.cc/7LKT-XEMZ.
4. Id. 
5. Genes are units of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) which encode the 
necessary information for cells to reproduce and to produce specific proteins.
6. Jordan, supra note 3.
7. Id.
8. A hectare is a unit of measurement in the metric system, equivalent to 
10,000 square meters, or 2.471 acres. Hectare, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
https://perma.cc/AZL4-7MH8 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017).
9. Ruiz-Marrero, supra note 2.
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susceptible to the diseases once ripe.10 Scientists and environmentalists are 
concerned the transgenic corn could completely usurp the Creole variety, 
which has become largely resistant to local plagues and diseases.11 The 
uncontrollable nature of genetically modified crops is no longer 
speculative. Once released into the wild, it is almost impossible to track 
these crops as they crossbreed with other varieties. 
Now consider if the crop in Mexico12 had been genetically modified to 
contain “terminator technology,” which is a suicide mechanism inserted into 
seeds that causes them to terminate upon completion of the first production 
cycle.13 Inventors developed this trait with the purpose of protecting their 
rights in the patented seeds, as it would force farmers to return to the seller 
each year for new seed. Once released into the environment, this technology 
could be passed through interbreeding with the native varieties and 
eventually eliminate a major native food source. Mexico, a nation that has 
consciously taken steps to ban all GM crops but not GM commodities, could 
still fall victim to the vast negative environmental impact caused by these 
seeds. Borders and legislation cannot keep genetically modified seeds out of 
the country. The international spread of this dangerous terminator 
technology must be stopped before it is too late.
Countries all around the world share the responsibilities of care and 
preservation of the environment. When faced with the choice of protecting 
the future environment versus encouraging innovation and progress through 
issuance of patents, countries should turn to the Agreement on Trade-
Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) for guidance. 
Enacted in 1997, this Agreement completely changed the landscape of 
international intellectual property rights.14 TRIPS regulates the patenting 
of life forms through Article 27, which sets forth general provisions 
regarding patentable subject matter and three subparagraphs describing
exemptions:15 “Subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 3, patents 
                                                                                                            
10. The reliance on a single crop of one genetic makeup may make the same 
crop more vulnerable to disease. If a plague wipes out this single crop, it can 
devastate a society. This occurred during the Irish potato famine in 1845; more 
recently in the United States, blight hit many cornfields with certain hybrid varieties 
of corn producing only half of projected yields. David Daniel, Seeds of Hope: How 
New Genetic Technologies May Increase Value to Farmers, Seed Companies, and 
the Developing World, 36 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 250, 260 (2010).
11. Jordan, supra note 3.
12. MARGARET MELLON & JANE RISSLER, GONE TO THE SEED: TRANSGENIC 
CONTAMINANTS IN THE TRADITIONAL SEED SUPPLY 45, 47 (2004).
13. Daniel, supra note 10.
14. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights art. 
27, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement].
15. Id.
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shall be available for any inventions, whether products or processes, in all 
fields of technology, provided that they are new, involve an inventive step 
and are capable of industrial application . . . .”16
Most relevant to the issue at hand is Article 27.2, which provides some 
exclusions from patentability. The words of this clause are vague, and the 
standard is muddled; overall, this clause raises many practical questions.17
Yet, one point is clear: member nations have the authority to refuse to 
grant patents to environmentally risky inventions.18
Members may exclude inventions from patentability within their 
territories if preventing the commercial exploitation of those inventions is 
necessary to protect ordre public or morality, including to protect human, 
animal, or plant life or health or to avoid serious prejudice to the environment,
provided that such exclusion is not made merely because the exploitation is 
prohibited by their law.19
Article 27.2 allows concerned countries to discourage the development 
of dangerous terminator technology,20 while still incentivizing the creation 
of beneficial GM agriculture. As countries take advantage of this provision, 
they will hopefully encourage more countries to follow suit. Cooperation 
among concerned countries is necessary because the mitigation of 
environmental damage is not a job that can be completed within the borders 
of a single country. Through use of Article 27.2, countries can encourage 
companies to develop more beneficial GM crops, while discouraging the 
production of terminator technology.
In interpreting the TRIPS Article 27.2 exceptions to patentability, a 
bright-line rule should be implemented that classifies genetically modified 
crops inserted with terminator technology as inherently “prejudicial to the 
environment.” This rule would allow all Member States to refuse such 
patents without further analysis, which would protect the long-term status 
of the environment. Not all genetically modified organisms are fully 
understood by the scientific community, but there is plenty of evidence that 
destruction could be caused by GM crops embedded with terminator 
technology as they spread uncontrollably through cross-pollination. 
                                                                                                            
16. Id.
17. M. Bruce Harper, TRIPS Article 27.2: An Argument for Caution, 21 WM.
& MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 381, 383 (1997).
18. Id. at 383-84.
19. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14.
20. Biotechnology companies recently developed a direct intellectual 
property enforcement mechanism referred to as “terminator” technology that 
causes plants to effectively self-destruct at the end of their cycle. See Debra M. 
Strauss, The Application of TRIPS to GMOs: International Intellectual Property 
Rights and Biotechnology, 45 STAN. J. INT’L L. 287, 299 (2009).
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Part I of this article will lay out the foundation of genetically modified 
organisms and terminator technology. Part II will examine the patent system 
and how it offers incentives for inventors. Part III will outline the history of 
TRIPS Article 27.2 and its purpose. Part IV will discuss interpretation of 
Article 27.2, with emphasis on the phrase “serious prejudice to the 
environment,” and apply the interpretation to genetically modified crops. 
Part V will suggest solutions that promote the protection of the environment, 
including a proposed bright-line rule regarding the interpretation of Article 
27.2. Implementation of this standard is urgent: humans may have a moral 
obligation to protect the environment for future generations.
I. GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS
A. An Introduction to Genetically Modified Crops
Hungarian engineer Kal Ereky coined the term “biotechnology” in 
191921 and paved the way for the discovery of the DNA double helix in 
1953.22 His research also led to the development of recombinant DNA23
technologies in the 1970s; these events formed the cornerstones of modern 
biotechnology.24 In 1989, Australia was the first nation in the world to 
approve the sale of a genetically modified organism.25 Over time, the 
introduction of GM products into the daily lives of many Americans has 
increased exponentially. By 2016, ninety-three percent of cotton, ninety-
four percent of soybean, and ninety-two percent of corn acreage in the 
United States was genetically modified.26
                                                                                                            
21. Policy Brief: Modern Biotechnology and the OECD, OECD OBSERVER
(Org. for Econ. Co-operation & Dev.), June 1999, https://perma.cc/6YEE-6NEW.
22. See Leslie G. Restaino et al., Patenting DNA-Related Inventions in the 
European Union, United States and Japan: A Trilateral Approach or a Study in 
Contrast?, 2 UCLA J. L. & TECH. 1 (2003).
23. Recombinant DNA is a molecule consisting of segments of DNA from 
different genomes that have been joined end-to-end outside of living cells and have 
the capacity to infect some host cell being maintained therein. Anthony J.F. 
Griffiths, Recombinant DNA Technology, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, https://per
ma.cc/KWE8-6HB9 (last visited Dec. 19, 2017). 
24. Restaino et al., supra note 22.
25. Carlos Scott Lopez, Intellectual Property Reform for Genetically Modified 
Crops: A Legal Imperative, 20 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 367, 370 (2004).
26. Recent Trends in GE Adoption, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC. ECON. RES. SERV., 
https://perma.cc/AP5G-6F63 (last updated July 12, 2017).
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1. Benefits of Genetically Modified Crops
There are vast potential benefits to the use of GM crops: more productive 
harvests, improved food quality—such as vitamin-enriched products, and 
decreased dependence on environmentally dangerous chemicals and 
pesticides.27 Higher quality crops, including those genetically modified to 
resist disease, can be produced in greater quantities, more than meeting 
market demand and leading to decreased hunger.28
Concerns about environmental impacts of GM foods have tended to 
be regulated by applying or adapting existing provisions of environmental 
law.29 Today, many crops are genetically modified to be resistant to pests, 
grow more quickly, and produce higher yields.30 Because they often 
require fewer natural resources to grow, these crops are also less taxing on 
the environment.31 Yet, a heated debate continues regarding whether planting 
genetically modified crops actually increases yields. For example, a 2008 
article published in Britain's The Independent referenced an authoritative new 
study demonstrating that genetically modified soy produced ten percent less 
food than the non-genetically modified variety.32 However, no conclusive 
scientific evidence has surfaced to indicate significant health or environmental 
threats unique to GM crops.33
                                                                                                            
27. Henrique Freire de Oliviera Souza, Genetically Modified Plants: A Need
for International Regulation, 6 ANN. SURV. INT'L & COMP. L. 129, 138 (2000).
28. See George E.C. York, Global Foods, Local Tastes and Biotechnology: 
The New Legal Architecture of International Agricultural Trade, 7 COLUM. J.
EUR. L. 423, 429 (2001).
29. Dr. Andrew W. Torrance, Intellectual Property as the Third Dimension 
of GMO Regulation, 16 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 257, 262 (2007).
30. Julie Teel, Rapporteur's Summary of the Deliberative Forum: Have 
NGOs Distorted or Illuminated the Benefits and Hazards of Genetically Modified 
Organisms?, 13 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 137, 146 (2002).
31. Lopez, supra note 25, at 375.
32. Geoffrey Lean, Exposed: The Great GM Crops Myth, INDEPENDENT, Apr. 
19, 2008, https://perma.cc/7TSQ-5P4G.
33. Torrance, supra note 29, at 271 n.77; see, e.g., Philip J. Dale et al., Potential 
for the Environmental Impact of Transgenic Crops, 20 NATURE BIOTECH. 567
(2002). Evolutionary theory suggests that the probabilities of GM organisms 
spreading their genes into natural populations are very low. Given the rigors of 
natural selection, and the unlikelihood that human tinkering will be superior to 
millions of years of evolution at selecting genetic traits advantageous for survival 
and reproduction, GM organisms will tend to be less, rather than more, likely to 
survive in the wild than their unmodified wild cousins. By corollary, any wild 
organism to which GM genes do spread will tend to survive less well because of 
those GM genes than their purely non-GM wild cousins. Evolutionary theory 
suggests that, far from becoming superorganisms that supplant wild biodiversity, 
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Biotechnological advances might help to meet the goal of sustainable 
development by improving the efficiency of land use and increasing the 
amount of available food.34 Some scholars suggest that genetically 
engineered crops will reduce world hunger and the likelihood of famine.35
Yet, other experts say that the cause of world hunger is not the overall lack 
of food but the lack of accessibility.36 In fact, eighty percent of the people 
suffering from hunger live in food-exporting countries.37
2. The Negative Impact of Genetically Modified Organisms
“Genetically modified organism” (GMO) refers to a life form that has 
been altered using recombinant DNA techniques.38 Biotechnology and 
GMOs may be a double-edged sword involving both promises for 
sustainable use or resources through environmentally sound technologies 
and perils to biodiversity through unexpected harmful interaction with the 
environment.39 Genetic drift most commonly occurs through a process 
called outcrossing, in which domesticated plants hybridize with wild 
relatives.40 Modified DNA, like any other form of DNA, is transferred to 
other plants by cross-pollination.41 Cross-pollination is the biggest 
problem, as pollen can stay airborne for hours and be carried by the wind 
or insects for distances of several kilometers.42
                                                                                                            
GM organisms and the genetic material they carry will tend to disappear quickly 
after entering natural ecosystems.
34. Yvonne Cripps, Patenting Resources: Biotechnology and the Concept of 
Sustainable Development, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 119, 127 (2001). 
35. Id. at 121. See ROYAL SOC’Y OF LONDON ET AL., TRANSGENIC PLANTS &
WORLD AGRICULTURE (2000), https://perma.cc/SC6E-RVK8.
36. GMOs: The Wrong Answer to the Wrong Problem, Interview with Rafael 
Mariano, Head of the Peasant Movement in the Philippines, in VOICES FROM THE 
SOUTH, THE THIRD WORLD DEBUNKS MYTHS ON GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS
6-7 (Ellen Hickey & Anuradha Mittal eds., 2003), https://perma.cc/E5N4-RH7D.
37. Id.
38. Ramesh Karky & Mark Perry, The World Trade Organization Obligations 
and Legislative Policy: Choices in Developing Countries for Biotechnology, 22 
CURRENTS INT’L TRADE L.J. 13, 14 (2013).
39. Cripps, supra note 34, at 121-23.
40. Daniel, supra note 10, at 262.
41. Id.
42. Peter Straub, Farmers in the IP Wrench – How Patents on Gene-Modified 
Crops Violate the Right to Food in Developing Countries, 29 HASTINGS INT’L &
COMP. L. REV. 190-91 (2006).
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Outcrossing is unavoidable and cannot be stopped by physical barriers 
or country borders.43 Sometimes farmers must create buffer areas around 
their crops in order to protect non-target crops, but these buffer zones are 
not the solution to genetic drift. In some instances, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) has concluded that the imposition of buffer 
zones is not the most “scientifically appropriate” method for mitigating 
the risk of exposure to pesticide drift.44 It only takes one breeding cycle 
for crops to stray from expectation.
Another problem is that genetically modified crops are inconsistently 
and inadequately managed.45 Specifically, the intellectual property rights 
associated with GM crops are often muddled, inconsistent, or unclear, 
which could contribute to the interests of key inter-regional, interstate, and 
international constituents being either ignored, misunderstood, or 
unprotected.46 Genetically modified crops cannot be managed; once they 
are released into the environment, the consequences of their uncontrolled 
reproduction in the face of decreased biodiversity cannot be predicted.47
Food products are modified for many different purposes such as the 
insertion of antibiotic-resistant genes as marker genes during the research 
and development process.48 In recent decades, studies have shown that 
consumption of animals treated with antibiotics contributes to strains of 
antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans.49 These antibiotic-resistant strains 
of bacteria cause humans to become more virulently ill for a longer period 
of time than do antibiotic-susceptible bacteria.50 The application of 
biotechnology to farming practices may result in a vicious cycle: GM crops 
give rise to a contaminated ecological system; the contaminated ecological 
system to contaminated agricultural products; contaminated products to 
contaminated food; and contaminated food to contaminated human bodies.51
                                                                                                            
43. Id.
44. See Pesticide Action Network N. Am. v. U.S. EPA, 654 F. App'x 887, 
888 (9th Cir. 2016).
45. Lopez, supra note 25, at 369.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Tore Midtvedt, Antibiotic Resistance and Genetically Modified Plants, 
Sept. 25, 2014, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4176670/.
49. Ariele Lessing, Killing Us Softly: How Sub-Therapeutic Dosing of 
Livestock Causes Drug-Resistant Bacteria in Humans, 37 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 463, 464 (2010).
50. Id. at 464-65.
51. Young-Gyoo Shim, Intellectual Property Protection of Biotechnology 
and Sustainable Development in International Law, 29 N.C.J. INT’L L. & COM.
REG. 157, 206 (2003).
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In many countries, the public has already expressed concerns over the 
regulation of biotechnology, particularly GM crops, and the risks of this 
technology on health and the environment.52 In this age of globalization 
and technology transfer, a recipient nation may receive much more than it 
bargained or even wished for when it imports organisms or organic 
material from overseas.53 The herbicide-resistant crops may lead to 
increased environmental pollution and increased risks to human health.54
Environmentalists argue that it should not be overlooked that diffusions 
of GM crops can threaten biological diversity because of their unanticipated 
environmentally unfriendly effects.55 While the widespread planting of GM 
crops has led to a decrease in pesticide use, there is an upward trend of 
herbicide use to prevent weeds.56 Herbicides can be applied broadly and in 
significant quantities across wide areas without fear of damage to the crops 
in question, but there is a risk of chemical infiltration into water supplies.57
Powerful pesticides can produce undesirable new creatures such as new 
resistant pests that humans cannot control and ultimately lead to serious 
imbalances in ecology.58 These pesticides pose a significant environmental 
problem because large doses of the chemicals can harm biodiversity and 
increase water and air pollution over time.59 Most of the long-term effects 
of GM crops are uncertain. Pests that are targeted by these agricultural 
methods can adapt to pesticides in addition to the DNA changes in GM 
plants that make them “resistant.”60 This means that pesticide-resistant 
crops will not always be effective, and their toxic legacies could remain.61
Pest-resistant crops often fail to distinguish between harmful and 
ecologically desirable insects, and thus cause imbalance in ecosystems.62
Because GM crops are often bred to be resistant or immune to pesticides 
and herbicides, farmers feel more free to use these toxic substances, which 
                                                                                                            
52. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 20.
53. Cripps, supra note 34, at 126-27. For example, various countries were 
concerned about seemingly environmentally sound cattle and cattle embryos 
imported from the United Kingdom at the height of the “mad cow” epidemic.
54. Id. at 122.
55. Shim, supra note 51, at 164.
56. Caroline Newman, Largest-Ever Study Reveals Environmental Impact of 
Genetically Modified Crops, PHYS.ORG (Sept. 16, 2016), https://perma.cc/2WMJ-LE8S.
57. Cripps, supra note 34, at 122.
58. Lakshman D. Guruswamy, Sustainable Agriculture: Do GMOs Imperil 
Biosafety?, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 461, 475-76 (2001).
59. Newman, supra note 56.
60. Emily Glass, The Environmental Impact of GMOs, ONE GREEN PLANET
(Aug. 2, 2013), https://perma.cc/2RC9-X7VT.
61. Id. 
62. Cripps, supra note 34, at 122.
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often negatively affect non-target beneficial organisms, such as bees and 
butterflies.63 In 1999, a Cornell University study found that GMOs 
containing pesticides, such as Bt-corn,64 caused harm to Monarch butterfly 
larvae, which are beneficial insects.65 Genetic engineering also leads to the 
use of fewer varieties of crops in favor of those deemed most efficient.66
Monoculture also greatly enhances risk from pests and diseases.67
Farmers and consumers, especially in Europe and developing countries, 
who worry about genetically modified products’ unidentified hazards to 
human health and the environment, among other impacts, often oppose the 
extensive introduction of GMOs.68 Thailand has extended a ban on all 
GMOs and decided to maintain the ban until national biosafety regulations 
are developed.69 India has limited cultivation of GM cottonseeds since 2002 
and postponed Bt-eggplant cultivation until it is proven safe for human 
health and the environment.70 There is doubt as to these developing 
countries’ ability to conduct thorough risk assessments of GM products.71
Without the promise of exclusivity, no biotechnology company would 
have the financial incentive to commit to research and development.72
There is evidence that allowing such patents inevitably creates monopolies 
of biotech companies, which hampers scientific progress and is therefore 
not in the public interest.73 When inventors—including universities—have 
a direct financial stake in the outcome of their research, this patent protection 
                                                                                                            
63. Glass, supra note 60.
64. Bacillus thuringiensis (“Bt”) is a naturally-occurring bacterium found in 
soil that possesses an unusual property: it produces a protein that kills certain crop-
destroying insects. While the Bt protein is a natural pesticide, it is not harmful to 
humans, animals, or beneficial insects like bees and ladybugs. Monsanto Co. v. 
Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc., 61 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (D. Del. 1999).
65. Carol Kaesuk Yoon, Altered Corn May Imperil Butterfly, Researchers 
Say, N.Y. TIMES, May 20, 1999, http://www.nytimes.com/1999/05/20/us/altered-
corn-may-imperil-butterfly-researchers-say.html. 
66. Cripps, supra note 34, at 122.
67. Id.
68. Shim, supra note 51, at 177.
69. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 17-18; See GMO Update: US-EU Biotech 
Dispute; EU Regulations; Thailand, BIORES (Sept. 10, 2004), https://perma.cc/7Q
4A-X8N4.
70. India Puts on Hold First GM Food Crop on Safety Grounds, BBC NEWS
(Feb. 9, 2010), https://perma.cc/5NK5-8JL2.
71. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 18.
72. Strauss, supra note 20, at 302.
73. Id.; see FOOD SAFETY DEP’T, WORLD HEALTH ORG., MODERN FOOD
BIOTECHNOLOGY, HUMAN HEALTH & DEVELOPMENT: AN EVIDENCE-BASED 
STUDY 55 (2005), https://perma.cc/YWC9-ESJC.
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may discourage the inventors’ inquiry into the risks of their developed 
technology. This practice can potentially divert research from sustainability 
and environmentally friendly alternatives.74
B. Terminator Technology
In 1998, Delta and Pine Land Company (D&PL) and the United States 
Department of Agriculture (USDA) acquired a patent for a genetically 
modified seed called Technology Protection System.75 This became 
known as “terminator technology.”76 Terminator technology77 is a 
genetically engineered suicide mechanism that causes the next generation 
of a seed to self-destruct through self-poisoning.78 This technology can
replace the “technology agreement” that seed manufacturers, such as the 
powerhouse Monsanto, require farmers to sign.79 Terminator technology 
works by creating lots of toxic protein in the embryo of the seed that will 
kill the cells of the plant’s seeds.80
                                                                                                            
74. 35 U.S.C.A. §§ 200-211 (2012); 37 C.F.R. § 401 (1989); 45 C.F.R. § 650 
(1992).
75. Samantha M. Ohlgart, The Terminator Gene: Intellectual Property Rights 
vs. The Farmer’s Common Law Right to Save Seed, 7 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 473 
(2002). See U.S. Patent No. 5,723,765 (issued Mar. 3, 1998).
76. Strauss, supra note 20.
77. Id. This technology has since been purchased by Monsanto. U.S. Patent 
No. 5,977,441 (filed Nov. 2, 1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,925,808 (filed July 20, 
1999); U.S. Patent No. 5,723, 765 (filed Mar. 3, 1998).
78. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
79. A Technology Agreement must be signed by farmers prior to seed 
purchases for a range of crops and Monsanto patents. It is described as a “limited 
license” between the grower and Monsanto to use RR soybeans, etc. The grower 
agrees to: (1) Acquire seed only from a seed company licensed by Monsanto; (2) 
Use seed “solely for planting a single commercial crop;” (3) “Not to save or clean 
any crop produced from Seed for planting, not to supply Seed produced from Seed 
to anyone for planting, not to plant seed for [seed] production” and; (4) Not to 
plant or transfer “for crop breeding, research, or generation of herbicide 
registration data.” See Monsanto Technology/Stewardship Agreement, Monsanto 
(2011), https://perma.cc/MZE9-TK5R (providing, at clause 14, the several patents 
to which the farmers were to be bound).
80. Martha Crouch, How the Terminator Terminates: An Explanation for the 
Non-Scientist of a Remarkable Patent for Killing Second-Generation Seeds of 
Crop Plants, EDMONDS INSTITUTE (Revised ed. 1998), https://perma.cc/S3RK-
RL2J. The preferred toxin is the ribosome inhibitor protein because it is non-toxic 
to organisms other than plants. Id. 
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1. History of Terminator Seeds
Previously, farmers relied on saved seeds with the most beneficial 
characteristics for the production of the next year’s crop, a right given to 
them by the Plant Variety Protections Act.81 In its decision in Asgrow Seed 
Co. v. Winterboer, the 1995 U.S. Supreme Court narrowed this common 
law right to save seeds to only cover farmers who saved seeds to replant 
on his or her own property.82 Since the terminator gene does not allow a 
seed to germinate, the farmers that plant those seeds can no longer save 
any to replant next season.83
In 1998, Monsanto agreed to buy D&PL, then withdrew its application 
and instead announced that it would not use the terminator technology.84
Monsanto made this decision in response to insistent protests by farmers, 
environmental groups, and development agencies. Terminator technology 
would have severe consequences on farmers around the world, especially 
those in developing countries who depend on saving seeds to replant from 
year to year.85
Other companies, such as Pioneer Hi-Bred, Rhone Poulenc, and 
DuPont, have developed similar techniques to produce sterile seeds.86
With the recent news of the merger of Monsanto and Bayer,87 along with 
some other biotech companies, there is little doubt that the initial promises 
not to deploy terminator seeds have been overthrown by new realities.88
                                                                                                            
81. Plant Variety Protection Act, 91 Pub. L. No. 577, § 113, (84 Stat. 1542); 
see also Jeremy P. Oczek, In the Aftermath of the “Terminator” Technology 
Controversy: Intellectual Property Protections for Genetically Engineered Seeds 
and the Right to Save and Replant Seeds, 41 B.C. L. REV 627, 647 (2000).
82. Asgrow Seed Co. v. Winterboer, 513 U.S. 179 (1995).
83. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
84. Yves Savidan, Terminator Genes: Fertility Rights, THE ECONOMIST, Oct. 
9, 1999, at 104. At the time the announcement was made, Monsanto's Chief 
Executive Officer explained that “Though we do not own any sterile seed 
technology, we think it is important to respond . . . by making clear our commitment 
not to commercialize gene protection systems that render seed sterile.”
85. Paul Brown, Monsanto Drops GM “Terminator,” THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 
4, 1999), https://perma.cc/GKF5-RUFL.
86. Ohlgart, supra note 75.
87. Krishnadev Calamur, Bayer and Monsanto’s Mega Merger, THE 
ATLANTIC, Sept. 14, 2016, https://perma.cc/ZK47-FREY.
88. Ikechi Mgbeoji, The “Terminator” Patent and Its Discontents: 
Rethinking the Normative Deficit in Utility Test of Modern Patent Law, 17 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 95, 121 n.111 (2004).
Two new terminator patents that were applied for and issued after the 
promises were made include: US Patent 6,297,426, issued October 2, 
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As the use of genetically modified seeds has increased and the development 
of these seeds has become more competitive, large manufacturers have 
realized there is more long-term value in the use of terminator technology.89
A Monsanto spokesperson claimed that the technology is simply “a way to 
protect their [company’s] billions of dollars of investment into research on 
biologically-engineered products.”90
2. Purpose of Terminator Seeds 
While patents are generally designed to transfer valuable information 
to the public after the duration of the patent term, terminator seeds ensure 
that the ultimate control of the genetic traits of the patented life form 
remains in the hands of the seed developer, at least until the patent 
expires.91 Because the seeds cannot reproduce, this technology ensures 
that a farmer cannot use the seed for his own crop and also sell the seed 
for a profit. This mechanism encourages manufacturers to spend more time 
and money developing new and helpful farming techniques, but in the long 
term, farmers suffer harm because they have to rely more heavily on 
technology developers to supply their seed. While this technology may be 
beneficial for the manufacturers that develop it, the effects of these seeds 
reach farther than the farmers that plant them. Spreading of these seeds 
through common cross-pollination could have a catastrophic impact on the 
global food supply.92 If the terminator gene is crossbred with conventional 
crop varieties through outcrossing, the gene could wipe out entire fields. 
                                                                                                            
2001 and US Patent 6,228,643, issued May 8, 2001. According to the 
ETC Group, the former describes “the identification and inactivation of 
a native gene critical to female fertility. This gene is cloned, linked to an 
inducible promoter and inserted into the plant. The result is a plant that 
is functionally female sterile with inducible female fertility. This 
approach involves chemical control of female fertility and its extension 
to other seed lines ….” Id. Another concern about terminator patents is 
that they probably help to consolidate the seed industry in a few powerful 
conglomerates such as Monsanto, Mycogen, Novartis. However, there is 
considerable debate on whether such consolidation is necessarily 
harmful to society.
89. Haley Stein, Intellectual Property and Genetically Modified Seeds: The 
United States, Trade, and the Developing World, 3 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP.
160, 168 (2005).
90. Id.
91. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 97. 
92. Strauss, supra note 20, at 300 n.89. 
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3. Recent Reactions to Terminator Technology
In 2000, the United Nations’ Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) 
implemented a de facto moratorium on sterile seed technologies under the 
term “Genetic Use Restriction Technologies” (GURTs).93 In 2006, parties 
voted to extend the moratorium.94 Despite pressures over time from Canada, 
Australia, New Zealand, the United States, and from the biotechnology 
industry as a whole, the CBD has nevertheless maintained its stance.95 Yet, 
a large and growing body of scientific studies into the human health and 
environmental safety of GMOs and GM crops has failed to reveal significant 
justification for the extreme precautionary approach adopted by the United 
Nations.96 There is a fear that the moratorium will not last much longer, 
especially as long as the United States continues to pressure the UN; a long-
term solution is needed.
In 2000, a group of more than three hundred scientists voiced concern 
about genetically modified seed plants, as well as related terminator 
technology, in a letter to the Fifth Conference of the Parties (COP) 
Convention on Biological Diversity, stating: “we call for the immediate 
suspension of the release of [terminator] crops and products, both 
commercially and in open field trials.”97 Numerous environmental non-
governmental organizations condemned the technology as a threat to 
agricultural food security.98 Some countries such as India, Ghana, and 
Panama have gone so far as to take steps to place a moratorium on the so-
called terminator seed technology in their own countries.99 Even the USDA, 
which was a former developer of terminator technology, was instructed by 
the Clinton Administration to discourage further terminator research.100
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C. The Benefits and the Burdens of Balancing Crops with Terminator 
Technology
There are two main benefits to terminator seeds: incentivizing 
research and reducing the need for contracts.
1. Benefits of Terminator Seeds
Plant breeders benefit from increased appropriation of research benefits 
from new products.101 Terminator seeds may increase productivity from 
improved inputs due to increased research and development investment.102
Also, there is evidence of increased agricultural productivity.103 Terminator 
technology seeds enable farmers to activate or deactivate genetic traits 
such as disease resistance.104 The self-destruct mechanism embedded in 
each plant containing the terminator demonstrates the essence of corporate 
domination over these natural resources and may offer better monopoly 
control than patents.105
Part of the attraction of terminator seeds for biotechnological seed 
merchants is that they dispense with the need for license agreements and 
end-user contracts between seed merchants and farmers.106 Until recently, 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture not only freely developed and 
distributed seeds but also encouraged farmers to save seeds.107 Seed saving 
is an ingrained part of agriculture, and today over eighty percent of farmers 
in developing nations rely on saved seeds for survival.108 In fact, the 
American agriculture industry is built upon sharing seeds from around the 
world.109 Yet, the introduction of terminator technology effectively 
eliminates the opportunity for farmers to save seed. Without the ability to 
save seeds, farmers in developing countries lose a large part of their 
livelihood.
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2. Harms of Terminator Seeds
There are both moral and health-related downsides to this technology. 
Risks of terminator seeds include risks of misuse of technology by plant 
breeders, danger of corporate vertical integration, increased risk of seed 
insecurity, impediment to access to genetic improvements, and genetic 
pollution and sterilization of otherwise fertile seeds.110 The Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations’ Panel of Eminent Experts 
on Ethics in Food and Agriculture noted “the Panel unanimously stated 
that the ‘terminator seeds’ generally are unethical, finding it unacceptable 
to market seeds.”111
Experts are also concerned about human and animal health; the 
introduction of one or more genes from completely unrelated organisms 
might produce toxins or allergens in the final food product.112 Plant genetic 
engineers desirous of creating a terminator gene and expressing it in a plant 
would take the promoter from a gene normally activated late in seed 
development and fuse that promoter to the coding sequence of a protein that 
will kill an embryo going through the last stages of development.113 The 
engineers often use a promoter from a cotton gene, which is toxic, so when 
this gene is embedded to create terminator technology, the final crop may 
not be edible to either humans or animals because of the increased toxicity 
of the seeds.114 There are potential changes to the nutritional contents and 
value of the seeds that have had several proteins in them destroyed by 
artificially induced toxic agents.115 The toxins in these seeds may cause 
allergic reactions, particularly if they are mixed up in the general food 
supply chain without adequate warning or notice to the public.116
In order to activate the toxin gene in seeds with terminator technology, 
the germinating seeds are soaked in antibiotics, such as tetracycline, before 
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112. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 17. Soybeans, for example, are low in 
the amino acids methionine and cysteine, so people whose diets are soybean-
based face a nutritional deficiency. Researchers responded by transferring a gene 
from Brazil nuts which codes for large amounts of these acids. While they initially 
saw a great opportunity, these researchers were ultimately disappointed by the 
fact that the protein was also an allergen. 
113. Mgbeoji, supra note 88, at 101.
114. Id. at 119.
115. Id.
116. Id.; see Convention on Biological Diversity, Consequences of the Use of the 
New Technology for the Control of Plant Gene Expression for the Conservation and 
Sustainable Use of Biological Diversity, U.N. Doc. UNEP/CBD/SBSTTA/4/9/Rev.1 
(May 17, 1999).
598 LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES [Vol. VI
the seeds are sold to the farmers.117 Throughout this process, there is a lot 
of tetracycline to handle and dispose, and large-scale agricultural uses of 
antibiotics are already seen as a threat to the overall well-being of 
society.118 Further, soil ecology can suffer due to the increased tolerance 
of bacteria, residual, or waste antibiotics.119
D. Summary of Balancing
There is no clear and undisputed scientific evidence that GM products 
are either good or bad for human, animal, and plant health and life.120 Not 
all genetically modified organisms are inherently “evil,” yet the potential 
unknown harms of GM crops embedded with terminator technology are 
cause for concern. The risk of cross-pollination is most concerning because 
once crops with the terminator gene are planted in an open air environment, 
there is no way to prevent cross-pollination of that destructive gene. 
Unfortunately, there is no international mechanism to deal with the 
danger that accompanies GM crops embedded with terminator technology. 
It is too unrealistic to expect each individual country to recognize and 
mitigate this danger on its own.121 Since it is impractical to confront this 
issue on a country-by-country basis, an international regime would be the 
ideal solution. Yet, knowing that such a vast international change may be 
difficult and time-consuming, nation-by-nation action is still beneficial 
and will hopefully encourage other countries to follow suit.
II. PATENTS AS INCENTIVES
A. Patent Theory
Since the government generally rejects raw natural material for patent 
approval, scientists are unable to receive patents for agriculture until they 
can prove that the food was truly “man-made” through genetic engineering.
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Today, one of the main motivations for developers of GM crops is the 
promise of patent protection and control, even if only for a limited period 
of time. Patents are a type of indirect funding for genetically engineered 
agriculture in that they provide incentives for parties to undertake 
expensive and risky research; they also induce upfront funding of projects 
with the expectation that monopoly profits can be generated over the long 
term.122
The quick-paced development process of GM crops leaves little time
to fully determine the potential harms of releasing these seeds into the 
environment. Once harmful GM crops are released into the environment 
on a broad scale, their potential impact is unknown, and any chance to 
reverse any resulting environmental degradation dramatically decreases.
B. The History of Plant Patenting, Biotechnology, and Genetically 
Modified Crops
1. The Global Development of Biotechnology
Biotechnology, as defined by the United Nation’s Convention of 
Biological Diversity, is “any technological application that uses biological 
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify 
products or processes for specific use.”123 The CBD acknowledges an 
implicit value in nature itself, recognizing: “biological diversity is about 
more than plants, animals, and microorganisms and their ecosystems – it
is about people and our need for food security, medicines … and [a] 
healthy environment in which to live.”124
2. Plant Patents in the United States
Until 1930, plants and seeds were not considered patentable material in 
the United States because they were a product of nature and therefore not 
amenable to the written description requirement for patents.125 This changed 
in 1930 when Congress passed the Plant Protection Act (PPA), which 
granted patent rights to plant breeders as long as the plant met the three 
eligibility requirements of a patent: novelty, utility, and non-obviousness.126
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For forty years, the PPA served as the only source of intellectual property 
rights for inventions that contained living matter, but these rights only 
extended to asexually reproduced plants.127 Congress enacted the Plant 
Variety Protection Act (PVPA) in 1970, which gave plant breeders twenty 
years of patent protection for any plant variety that is new, distinct, 
uniform, and stable; this protection, though, came with a few 
exceptions.128 The series of biotech patenting cases that followed in the 
1980s and 1990s expanded the legal boundaries of patentable living matter
but also narrowed the traditional seed-saving exemption codified by the 
PPA.129
3. Patenting Genetically Modified Organisms
As the creation and production of biotechnology products has rapidly 
grown, courts in the U.S. and all over the world have been confronted with 
issues regarding whether these organisms should qualify for patent 
protection. In the landmark case Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that a live, genetically engineered 
microorganism came within the scope of patentable subject matter under 
35 U.S.C. § 101.130 The Court declared that “anything under the sun that 
is made by man” is patentable.131 In Ex Parte Hibberd, the U.S. Board of 
Patent Appeals and Interferences held that the PPA and PVPA were not 
the only sources of patent protection for plants.132 The broad category of 
utility patents also allowed plant patents. Currently in the United States, 
most biotechnology applications are pursued under utility rather than plant
patents.133
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In 1986, the United States allowed the first patent covering a 
genetically engineered variety of corn that was modified to have increased 
nutritional value.134 By 1996, the first patented genetically modified and 
commercially-grown food crops were planted in America.135 The Supreme 
Court confirmed patentability of plants and seeds in the U.S. in J.E.M. Ag 
Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., which emphasized that “the 
relevant distinction was not between living and inanimate things, but between 
products of nature, whether living or not, and human-made inventions.”136
4. History of Patenting Genetically Modified Crops Around the 
World
The U.S. has taken a more lenient position than Canada or the 
European Union (EU) in allowing patents of plants and plant varieties. 
Over time, the U.S. consistently expanded its definition of patentable plant 
material, while the EU has expressed more caution. A major goal of the 
United States during the TRIPS negotiations was to obtain comprehensive 
intellectual property protection for its agricultural biotechnology industry.137
In 2004, the EU enacted a fundamentally revised legal system for 
regulating GMOs, which served as the foundation of the EU’s policies of 
tight safety standards and freedom of choice for consumers and farmers.138
Canada does not consider animals and plants—genetically modified or 
otherwise—to constitute subject matter statutorily eligible for patent 
protection.139
C. Considering Morality
1. The Development of the Morality Doctrine
Under early American case law, courts developed and applied a 
doctrine of “moral utility,” which rejected patents for inventions that were 
considered “injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound morals of 
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society.”140 Later, in Juicy Whip v. Orange Bang, the Federal Circuit held 
that a product’s deceptive nature has no effect on its utility, and therefore, 
its patentability.141 In place of the concept of negative utility, courts support 
a concept of beneficial or nominal utility; a nominal showing of any 
beneficial use is enough for patentability in the U.S.,142 regardless of
arguably negative effects.143 Over time, courts rejected the past practice of 
denying patentability on the grounds of morality, such as with gambling 
devices, or because the invention might injure health, such as with drug 
safety.144 Instead, the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) 
primarily considers the positive utility of the invention, employing a “patent 
first, ask questions later” approach.145 Through employment of this method, 
the U.S. has decided to issue patents to all useful inventions, even if they 
could have potential to create a hazard.146
On the other hand, the EU exercises extreme caution when it comes to 
patenting potentially hazardous inventions, taking the “ask questions first, 
then patent” approach.147 There are numerous other countries with statutory 
provisions allowing inventions to be excluded from patentability on the basis 
of morality; thus, it is not surprising that in the TRIPS negotiations, this large 
group of countries was able to incorporate a morality provision into the 
agreement despite opposition from the United States.148
2. Application of the Morality Doctrine in the United States
A combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine and the 
expansive judicial interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject 
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matter has resulted in virtually no basis on which the USPTO or U.S. 
courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial, but otherwise 
patentable, subject matter.149 Instead, patent applicants and scientific 
inventors are deciding matters of public policy through the contents of the 
applications they file with the USPTO.150 Some experts argue that denying 
patents on morally controversial inventions will not stop the underlying 
research that is the source of public apprehension.151 While morally 
controversial inventions may cause temporary ethical concern, these 
experts believe that, in the end, the underlying research could reap beneficial 
results.152 Failing to grant patents on promising technology because of 
public misunderstandings of science may hinder important discoveries and 
deny life-saving cures to millions of people.153 Yet, when it comes to the 
dangerous terminator technology, it is necessary for individual countries to 
take steps toward determining that these inventions are immoral and 
therefore do not meet the basic requirements for patenting.
D. Patents are Beneficial to Society
Patents are beneficial to society because they encourage innovation 
and progress. By offering exclusive use and distribution of an invention 
for a period of time, patents reward inventors with funding they can use 
for research and development of future beneficial inventions. Countries 
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should continue to allow the issuance of patents for most beneficial GM 
crops, but countries should also have the ability to cut off the incentives 
for the development of GM crops embedded with terminator technology. 
Once these crops are no longer patentable, the economic value of developing 
such inventions diminishes, leading inventors to seek development of more 
beneficial agriculture technology instead. It is best to allow countries to 
refuse patenting of terminator technology, which is justified by the TRIPS 
Agreement, an international agreement that already has such a refusal 
mechanism in place.
III. THE HISTORY AND PURPOSE OF THE TRIPS AGREEMENT
In 1994, the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT)154 officially recognized that there is a relationship between 
free trade and environmental quality. GATT created the TRIPS Agreement 
with the intent to unify international intellectual property rights as a step 
towards the liberalization of trade.155 Twenty-two years later, many 
questions are still unanswered regarding the implications of this Agreement. 
To best protect the future of the environment on a global level, a clear 
international interpretation of this Agreement is necessary.
A. The Creation and Purpose of the TRIPS Agreement
Before TRIPS, the preeminent authority pertaining to international 
patent law was the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, but this Convention was mainly procedural.156 At that time, 
countries basically had freedom to create their own rules and regulations 
regarding the power to patent. International patent law changed when the 
1994 Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations resulted in both the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) and the TRIPS Agreement. TRIPS, a 
combination and expansion of multiple forms of pre-existing intellectual 
property standards, was the first multinational agreement to address these 
issues, including the scope of international intellectual property rights, the 
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means to enforce those rights, dispute resolution, the applicability of 
earlier international agreements, and transitional arrangements.157
One of the most controversial aspects of the Uruguay Round of GATT 
negotiations was the United States’ insistence in intellectual property 
jurisdiction based on the goals articulated for its own private interests.158
The goals of both the most-developed and least-developed countries were 
codified in the TRIPS Agreement. This Agreement harmonizes and 
strengthens international intellectual property protection by protecting 
technological inventions that meet general conditions, provided they do not 
fall within the few exceptions for inventions that are contrary to the 
Member State’s morals.159 There was sufficient support among the GATT 
member nations to include this restrictive provision in Article 27.2, even 
though it is contrary to the municipal law of the United States and other 
industrial countries.160
1. Implementation of the TRIPS Agreement
Article 7 of TRIPS mentions that the protections and enforcement of 
intellectual property rights should contribute to social and economic 
welfare.161 By linking intellectual property rights to trade, the WTO made 
compliance with TRIPS mandatory for member countries.162 Under 
Article 16.4 of the WTO agreement and Article 1.1 of the TRIPS 
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Agreement, WTO Member States are required to fulfill the obligation 
prescribed by the Agreement in their domestic law.163 Implementation of 
domestic policies regarding Article 27.2, though, is optional. Unlike the 
case of compulsory licenses, which must be granted case-by-case, Article 
27.2 allows each Member State to freely determine that a certain type or 
category of inventions is not patentable as long as the category falls into 
one of the exceptions.164
2. An Overview of the Structure of TRIPS
TRIPS contains a total of seventy-three articles, yet only two 
paragraphs in a single article touch on environmental issues.165 All 159 
Member States, including developing and least-developed countries, are 
obligated to patent all qualified inventions and include some forms of 
biotechnology law by year 2021, unless TRIPS Articles 27.2 or 27.3 or 
another exception is used.166 Generally, the regulatory framework needs to 
address the following areas of biotech: (1) scope of patentability of biotech 
innovation; (2) commercialization of genetically modified plants, crops, 
foods, and other products and scientific risk assessment; and (3) co-
existence of genetically modified, conventional and organic farming.167
TRIPS established a minimum twenty-year term of protection for patents 
in all WTO member countries.168
B. The Morality Doctrine as Interpreted in TRIPS
Throughout history, countries have refused to issue certain kinds of 
patents due to their moral convictions. Since morality is a vague concept, 
                                                                                                            
163. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 15. See Marrakesh Agreement, supra
note 154, art. XIV(a).
164. For example, all inventions relating to cloning of humans are patentable. 
CARLOS M. CORREA, TRADE RELATED ASPECTS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, A COMMENTARY TO THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 291 (2007).
165. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14.
166. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 15. See Council for Trade-Related Aspects 
of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Extension of the 'Transition Period under 
Art. 66.1 for Least Developed Country Members, WTO Doc. IP/C/64 (June 11, 
2013), https://perma.cc/R2LE-4H2D (providing least-developed countries an 
extended transitional period up to 2013 to fulfill TRIPS obligations. Now this 
transitional period has been extended to July 1, 2021.).
167. Karky & Perry, supra note 38, at 16 n.59. 
168. See TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, at 314. Article 33 states, “[t]he 
term of protection available shall not end before the expiration of a period of 
twenty years counted from the filing date.”
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its definition is dependent on national perceptions by patent offices or 
judges.169 In the TRIPS Agreement, the only avenue available for Member 
States to legislate regarding a patent with immoral character is through 
Article 27. Morality is important to interpretation of Article 27.2 because 
it allows the individual culture and customs of each country to be 
considered.
1. Other Countries’ Approaches to the Morality Doctrine 
Countries that have taken “ask questions first, then patent” approaches 
to morally controversial subject matter provide an illustrative alternative 
to the haphazard course the U.S. is currently pursuing.170 The Canadian 
Supreme Court demonstrated this approach in its 2002 decision that 
excluded higher life forms from patent protection, since there was no 
express statutory authorization for protection from Parliament.171 Yet, in 
2004, the Supreme Court of Canada seemed to take a conflicting route 
when it extended protection to a patent that claimed genes and cells but 
not a plant per se.172 This case presented a way for manufacturers of GM 
crops in Canada, such as Monsanto Canada, to gain patent protection for 
the genetically modified components of their plants, even if they could not 
receive protection for the plant as a whole. On the other hand, India has 
taken advantage of the patent exception provided in TRIPS Article 27.3 
by refusing to allow pharmaceutical patents.173 In efforts to reduce costs 
by allowing the production of generic drugs, India has chosen a patent 
system that brings the most benefit to its citizens.174
2. The EPO’s Balancing Test
When considering morality, the Examining Division of the European 
Patent Office (EPO) employs a balancing test, noting that “[f]or each 
individual invention [involving higher life forms] the question of morality 
has to be examined and possible detrimental effects and risks have to be 
                                                                                                            
169. CORREA, supra note 164, at 288.
170. Bagley, supra note 122, at 480.
171. See Harvard Coll. v. Canada (Commissioner of Patents), [2002] 4 S.C.R. 
45 (Can.) (considering the patentability of the Harvard Oncomouse under the 
Patent Act, the Supreme Court of Canada held that the Oncomouse and higher life 
forms in general are not patentable subject matter in Canada).
172. Monsanto Canada Inc. v. Schmeiser, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 902.
173. John LaMattina, India’s Solution to Drug Costs: Ignore Patents and Control 
Prices – Except For Home Grown Drugs, FORBES (Apr. 8, 2013), https://perma.cc
/Y74V-7CC8.
174. Id.
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weighed and balanced against the merits and advantages aimed at.”175 One 
problem with the test is that the Examining Division never defined morality 
or stated a basis, other than instructions from the Technical Board, for 
choosing those particular factors to balance as opposed to other possible 
concerns.176 Different bodies within the EPO articulated two additional 
morality tests: the unacceptability test and the public abhorrence test.177
According to Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention (EPC), 
inventions are to be excluded from patentability as being contrary to 
morality if the exploitation of that invention is not in conformity with the 
conventionally accepted standards of conduct pertaining to this culture.178
In Greenpeace v. Plant Genetic Systems, the EPO concluded that none of 
the claims in the patent violated this morality provision of Article 53(a) 
because they concerned activities (such as production of plants and seeds) 
and products (plant cells, plants, and seeds) which cannot be considered to 
be morally wrong.179 The EPO Board ignored the more specific concerns
regarding the patent’s subject matter and focused only on the general type 
of products and activities the patent concerned.180 Today, TRIPS Article 
27.2 seems to be the most natural path through which countries can 
demonstrate the morality balancing test as applied to genetically modified 
crops with terminator technology.
IV. INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 27.2
A. Interpreting TRIPS Article 27.2 in an Effort to Protect the
Environment
When it comes to interpreting the TRIPS Agreement in an effort to 
protect the environment, much is unclear. For example, TRIPS authorizes 
the patenting of plants and animals,181 but it fails to discuss how nations 
might prevent the destruction of biodiversity.182 According to the 
                                                                                                            
175. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] E.P.O.R. 501, 527.
176. Bagley, supra note 122, at 521.
177. Howard Florey/Relaxin, [1995] E.P.O.R. 541 (Opposition Div.); Lubrizol 
Hybrid Plants, [1988] E.P.O.R. 173 (Tech. Bd. App.).
178. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1995] E.P.O.R. 357, 366 (Tech Bd. App.).
179. Id. at 370.
180. Bagley, supra note 122, at 523.
181. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.3; see also Jennifer Schultz, The 
GATT/ WTO Committee on Trade and the Environment – Toward Environmental 
Reform, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 423, 436-37 (1995).
182. “Biological diversity” means the variability among living organisms from 
all sources including, inter alia, terrestrial, marine and other aquatic ecosystems 
and the ecological complexes of which they are a part; this includes diversity 
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fundamental principle of international treaty interpretation set out in the 
Vienna Convention, a treaty and the meaning of a term in that treaty shall 
be determined in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty.183
TRIPS accommodates the American view that “anything under the sun 
made by man” is patent-eligible, as well as the views of many other 
countries that deny patents on morally controversial inventions.184
There are no clear guidelines or standards to use when interpreting the 
TRIPS Agreement in its entirety. The plain meaning of the statutory 
language suggests a State may exclude an invention from patent protection 
if prevention of “commercial exploitation” of that invention in their 
territory is “necessary” in order to “protect ordre public or morality.”185
So far, each Member State has been free to interpret each of these phrases 
as it sees fit, but there is no evidence that any countries have taken 
advantage of Article 27.2 in efforts to avoid prejudice to the environment. 
A universal interpretation needs to be declared so that the Agreement is 
implemented in similar fashion around the world. There is no official 
interpretation of Article 27.2 of TRIPS as a whole, but several experts 
consider 27.2 to be analogous to Articles XX(a) and XX(b) of GATT.186
In order to derive the most logical interpretation of Article 27.2, each 
phrase must be analyzed separately. 
1. The Geographic Limitations of Article 27.2
The plain meaning of Article 27.2 suggests risks to ordre public or 
morality must come from the commercial exploitation of the inventions 
and not the invention in itself.187 While one isolated use of harmful 
technology may have little impact on the environment as a whole, once 
aggregated through commercialization, the impact greatly increases. Article 
27.2 does not intend to prevent the creation of every single invention that 
poses a potential risk to ordre public, but rather seeks to allow countries to 
align their patent law with a regime for preventing the commercial 
exploitation of such inventions. The phrase “within [a Member’s] territory”
                                                                                                            
within species, between species, and of ecosystems. United Nations Convention 
on Biological Diversity, supra note 123.
183. Shim, supra note 51, at 224 n.367.
184. Bagley, supra note 122, at 530.
185. Timothy G. Ackermann, Dis’ordre’ly Loopholes: TRIPS Patent 
Protection, GATT, and the ECJ, 32 TEX. INT’L L.J. 489, 492 (1997).
186. Marrakesh Agreement, supra note 154.
187. Chris R. Byrnes, Patenting Life: TRIPS Article 27 & Bolivia’s Proposal to 
Ban the Patenting of all Life Forms, 24 GEO. INT’LENVT’L. L. REV. 245, 258 (2012).
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also suggests that the impact of the risk must be within the territory of the 
concerned Member and not that of another.188 This language creates an 
environmental protectionism issue because a Member State could implement 
policies regarding protection of the environment, yet still be negatively 
affected by a neighboring state’s lack of such policy. Over time, these 
conflicting policies can lead to negative impacts on the environment, even in 
the Member States that have banned commercial exploitation and patenting. 
To best prepare for the future, a more comprehensive interpretation of 
Article 27.2 is needed.
2. Members May Exclude Patents When “Necessary”
A Member State may exclude an invention from patentability if it 
finds exclusion “necessary” to prevent commercial exploitation of that 
invention in order to protect ordre public or morality.189 TRIPS gives little 
guidance when allowing each Member State to decide for itself whether 
or not the prevention of commercial exploitation of any particular 
invention fulfills the definition of “necessary.”190
Articles XX(a) and XX(b) of the GATT exceptions parallel the 
structure of Article 27.2 with use of the language “necessary to protect 
public morals” and “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life and 
health.”191 Beyond acknowledging this parallel structure, GATT dispute 
resolution does not provide much guidance as to the interpretation of 
“necessary.”192 Patent restrictions would be considered “necessary” in 
terms of Article XX(b) only if there were no alternative measures through 
which a contracting party could reasonably be expected to achieve its 
policy objectives.193 Similar to the Article XIV(a) exception in United 
States v. Gambling, Article 27.2 of TRIPS requires a “necessity” test for 
its exceptions.194 Therefore, when determining if the exclusion of a 
biotechnology patent is “necessary,” a Member State should consider any 
                                                                                                            
188. Id.
189. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art 27.2.
190. Ackermann, supra note 185, at 493.
191. Byrnes, supra note 187, at 254; see also Harper, supra note 17, at 400-02; 
UNCTAD-ICTSD, RESOURCE BOOK ON TRIPS AND DEVELOPMENT 378 (2005).
192. Ackermann, supra note 185.
193. Robert Weissman, A Long Strange TRIPS: The Pharmaceutical Industry 
Drive to Harmonize Global Intellectual Property Rules, and the Remaining WTO 
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1069, 1103-05 (1996) (discussing the tests and concluding that they are the same).
194. Byrnes, supra note 187. “Members may exclude from patentability 
inventions, the prevention within their territory of the commercial exploitation of 
which is necessary to protect . . . .” TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.2.
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alternatives to excluding the patent and the impact of such alternatives, and 
then it should compare the impact of the alternatives to the impact of the 
proposed patent.
3. To Protect Ordre Public
Originally from the French Law,195 the term ordre public is related to 
the concept of public policy as used in Anglo-American doctrine.196 The 
concept of ordre public has been derived from “public order” or “public 
interest” or “wellbeing of the society,” and has been incorporated into 
patent legislation in some jurisdictions like the European Union and the 
United States.197 WTO Member States have considerable flexibility in 
defining the concept depending upon each country’s social values.198
a. Considering Ordre Public
Member States may only exclude an invention on the basis of ordre 
public where the failure to provide such protection results in exploitation 
or an offense against the forum’s concept of fundamental norms.199 For
example, some countries have expressed the belief that all life forms are 
sacred and should not be owned through traditional property rights.200
                                                                                                            
195. “Community common sense and common conscience, extended and applied 
throughout the state to matters of public morals, health, safety, welfare . . . .” Orde 
Public, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (6th ed. 1990).
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(2002), https://perma.cc/GGQ5-6E88 (criticizing “the patenting of life forms on ethical 
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TRIPS provides a non-exhaustive list of acceptable justifications, including 
protection of human, animal, or plant life or health and avoidance of serious 
prejudice to the environment.201
Arguably, a country could try to resist granting biotechnology patents 
through Article 27.2 on the grounds of strong public interest or to protect 
human health and the environment. However, a similar argument was 
unsuccessful in the Harvard Oncomouse case decided by the EPC.202
While the WTO standards and EPC standards do not always align, the 
standards could be applied in an analogous manner. When researchers 
from Harvard Medical School sought patent protection for a mouse that 
was genetically modified to be highly susceptible to cancer, the application 
raised ethical concerns.203 In considering this patent, the EPO discussed 
whether patents should be extended to life forms as a whole, particularly 
for higher-order animals such as mammals.204 While the United States 
quickly granted the patent for the mouse in 1988, the EPO took longer to 
analyze the dilemma but reached its final decision in 2004.205 The EPO 
applied Article 53(a) of the European Patent Convention and developed a 
utilitarian balancing test, assessing the potential benefits of the claimed 
invention against negative aspects.206 In this particular case, the EPC 
weighed the suffering of the mice against the expected benefits to 
humanity through new cancer research techniques. Ultimately, the patent 
was granted, setting the precedent that any patent on a living organism is 
found not to be contrary to ordre public or morality under EPC principles. 
When considering whether terminator technology is contrary to ordre 
public, countries must employ this utilitarian balancing test.
                                                                                                            
grounds” because “private ownership of substances created by nature is wrong, and 
inimical to cultural values in different parts of the world”).
201. TRIPS Agreement, supra note 14, art. 27.2.
202. Strauss, supra note 20, at 307.
203. Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1992] O.J. E.P.O.R. 588, 593 (Examining Div.).
204. Id. at 588.
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b. Using the Balancing Test to Determine Whether a Patent is 
Contrary to Ordre Public
The European Board of Appeal in its earlier Harvard Oncomouse
decision adopted the balancing exercise, or utilitarian approach.207 Courts 
have interpreted “serious prejudice” to include either actual or potential 
harm, so countries must consider both in attempt to accomplish a holistic 
review.208 Whenever an invention involves higher life forms, the question 
of morality has to be examined and possible detrimental effects and risks 
have to be weighed against the merits and advantages.209 When later 
considering the patent in Greenpeace, however, the Board expressly 
declined to employ the balancing test used in the Oncomouse decision, 
noting that it “was not the only way of assessing patentability” under 
Article 53(a) but was “just one possible way.”210 In that case, the decision 
as to whether Article 53(a) was a bar to patenting the plant invention at 
issue depended mainly on a careful weighing of the suffering of animals 
and possible risks to the environment on the one hand and the invention’s 
usefulness to mankind on the other.211
c. In Comparison to GATT
Examination of case history from GATT Article XX and GATS Article 
XIV can help determine the scope of Article 27.2 of TRIPS.212 Because 
protection of the environment falls under the umbrella term of ordre public
or morality, the primary analogue to GATT and GATS is best analyzed 
under the “public morals” exceptions of GATT Article XX(a) and GATS 
                                                                                                            
207. See Harvard/Onco-mouse, [1990] O.J. E.P.O.R 451 (Examining Div.); 
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Article XIV(a). These provisions deal with exceptions from patenting 
necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order, which 
extends to protection of human, animal, or plant life or avoidance of serious 
prejudice to the environment.213 GATT Article XX(a) and GATS Article 
XIV(a) cases should be read to include the same concerns under a TRIPS 
Article 27.2 analysis.214
d. In Comparison with the European Patent Commission
In general, the EPO has narrowly construed exceptions to patentability 
in the EPC, particularly with respect to plant and animal varieties.215 Similar 
to Article 27.2 of TRIPS, Article 53(a) of the EPC provides that European 
patents shall not be granted in “respect of inventions the publication or 
exploitation of which would be contrary to ordre public or morality, 
provided that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely 
because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all of the Contracting 
States.”216 Unlike TRIPS Article 27.2, this provision is mandatory.217
Today, inventions that cause serious prejudice to the environment can 
be considered contrary to ordre public, as the European Patent Office 
Board of Appeal held in Plant Genetic Systems.218 In this decision, the 
EPO considered the patentability of a plant that had been genetically 
modified to be resistant to glutamine synthetase inhibitors, a type of 
herbicide.219 In the reasons for its decision, the EPO stated that inventions 
likely to seriously prejudice the environment are contrary to ordre public
and should be excluded from patentability220 as long as threat to the 
environment is sufficiently substantiated at the time the decision is taken by 
the EPO.221 There is no specific reference in Article 53(c) to the protection 
of the environment, likely because this concern had not yet emerged at the 
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time the provision was adopted in 1973; the Plant Genetic Systems ruling 
shows that protection of the environment can now be read into its 
interpretation.222
4. And to Avoid “Serious Prejudice to the Environment”
Inventions that prejudice the environment can be considered contrary 
to ordre public, but it is not clear how extensive the prejudice must be 
before a country can exclude such subject matter from patentability.223 The 
text of Article 27.2 requires the prejudice to be serious, but this standard 
is still imprecise. The seriousness may be actual or potential since Article 
27.2 does not distinguish between the two.224 The “avoiding serious 
prejudice” provision appears to have emerged out of jurisprudence on 
exceptions to patentable subject matter under the EPC. This provision 
deviates from the EPC and European Directive by including the phrases 
“protecting human, animal or plant life or health” and “avoiding serious 
prejudice to the environment” as examples of “ordre public and morality.”
This wording takes a meaningful step forward in accounting for 
environmental factors. It is unquestionable that biological diversity concerns 
both protecting “human, animal or plant life or health” and “avoiding 
serious prejudice to the environment.”225
B. Applying Article 27.2 to Genetically Modified Crops
The fact that the TRIPS Agreement does not expressly address 
genetically modified products may result in inconsistent application, 
particularly concerning patents for living organisms, engineered gene 
materials, or the legal status of genetically modified crops. Moreover, 
incorporation of intellectual property issues into the trade-oriented TRIPS
Agreement has led to ambiguity in interpretation of the treaty norms.226 The 
best way to determine whether the ordre public benefits of genetically 
modified crops outweigh the potential prejudice to the environment is to 
employ the balancing test used by the European Patent Council in the 
Harvard Oncomouse case. When applied, this balancing test results in the 
conclusion that the benefits of GM crops with terminator technology do 
not outweigh the burden that the technology puts on society. Even without 
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comprehensive facts outlining the full impact of this technology, the 
potential consequences are too great to risk.
V. SOLUTIONS
A. Current Dispute Resolution Mechanisms
If a dispute arises regarding a country’s decision to exclude an 
invention from patentability according to TRIPS, the Dispute Settlement 
Body may scrutinize that decision.227 In the European Union, Member
States may invoke a safeguard provision and temporarily ban a GMO 
product if it is possibly harmful to human health or the environment.228
This is not a sufficient solution because other countries that trade with 
Europe are constantly pressuring the EU to lower its safety standards to 
allow for easier trade.
B. Proposed Alternate Solutions 
Until there is more research on terminator technology to prove that it 
is safe to use, such technology should be able to be banned by any WTO 
Member State through universal interpretation of TRIPS Article 27.2.
There is a clear trend towards the development of issue-specific legal 
mechanisms as a preferred means of dealing with environmental problems.229
The articulation of international legal principles through dispute resolution 
processes is slow and gradual and cannot address issues of prevention and 
collective action in the fine-grained way of law-making via treaty.230 The 
often-irreversible character of environmental damage, and the limitation 
of reparation after the fact, means that prevention of this damage is of the 
utmost importance.231 Patent law has historically been territorial in nature, 
with sovereign states granting patents and providing means for patentees 
to enforce their rights only within their borders.232 A more international 
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regime should be implemented in order to protect an environmental space 
that is not constrained to borders. An effective intellectual property regime 
must be international in scope.233
1. Proposed Solutions
States have a general obligation to ensure that activities within their 
jurisdiction respect the environment of other states and of areas beyond 
national control, as affirmed by the International Court of Justice in the 
Legality of the Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion.234
Nations have an obligation, expressed in Principle 17 of the Rio 
Declaration, to conduct an environmental impact assessment for any 
proposed activities that are likely to have a significant adverse impact on 
the environment and are subject to a decision of a competent national 
authority.235 When it comes to genetically modified technology that 
spreads rapidly and replicates naturally, individual nations do not have 
time to undergo this extensive safety assessment. Instead, the WTO should 
consider this environmental impact assessment within the interpretation of 
Article 27.2 as applied to genetically modified crops. Generally, compulsory 
licenses would help improve the environment, so a clear and international 
standard is necessary.236 While experts may argue that the grant or denial 
of patents on microorganisms and other biotechnology is not likely to put 
an end to genetic research or to its attendant risks, this debate should not 
prevent Member States from taking concrete steps to prohibit further 
degradation to the environment.237
2. The Precautionary Principle
It is appropriate under Article 27.2 for a nation to presume that certain 
inventions pose an environmental risk.238 International law in other areas 
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recognizes this possibility through the precautionary principle, one of the 
best-known principles of environmental protection.239 This provision has 
been described as an attempt to codify the concept of precaution in law, 
where “precaution” refers to a strategy for addressing risk.240 Principle 15 
of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development states that when 
there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific 
certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures 
to prevent environmental degradation.241 Annex III of the Cartagena Protocol 
on Biosafety242 declared that lack of scientific knowledge or scientific 
consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular 
level of risk, as absence of risk, or as an acceptable risk.243 Once a nation 
has perceived a potential risk to the environment, it should be able to freely 
act to prohibit this danger. Many times, a nation may act too late. To 
protect against this risk, a nation should require a pre-market showing 
from both domestic and foreign producers that an invention is safe.244
Precautionary regulation, such as that proposed in this Article, is justified 
when there is no clear evidence about a particular risk scenario, when the 
risk itself is uncertain, or until the risk is disproved.245 When it comes to 
terminator technology, the evidence is clear: this technology can and will 
damage the environment if released in great quantities. 
There is wide agreement that GATT allows any contracting party to 
adopt appropriate domestic environmental policies by providing countries 
with very considerable scope to use trade-related policies to protect 
national environmental resources without calling into question their 
GATT obligations.246 Both GATT and other international laws support the 
precautionary use of Article 27.2.247 GATT suggests that the interpretation 
of TRIPS Article 27.2 be approached through a two-step argument: (1) 
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GATT creates a rebuttable presumption supporting the use of international 
industrial standards and (2) the international standards of widest applicability 
endorse product life cycle management, pollution preventions, and product 
impact disclosure.248
Article 27.2 is not mandatory; members have discretion to prohibit 
immoral inventions.249 This provision of the TRIPS Agreement certainly 
covers the scope of genetically modified plants or foods and the freedom 
of the Member States to allow or not allow genetically modified products 
to be brought into its market or environment if the situations warrants.250
The questions that TRIPS cannot answer include where society should 
draw the line between protection that will stimulate innovation and 
progress and the level of protection that will stifle beneficial research or 
cause other harms.251
International intellectual property agreements alone will not provide 
solutions to the difficult questions regarding gene technologies and self-
replicating inventions. TRIPS is driven by a “commodity logic,” which 
aims to maximize profits for intellectual property producers.252 Given the 
troubled history that developing countries have experienced with the 
intellectual property system, marked especially by their historical inability 
to exercise meaningful sovereignty over intellectual property standards, it 
is only fair that the exceptions built into TRIPS provide broad latitude for 
policy objectives.253
CONCLUSION
There is a trend towards “upward harmonization” of global intellectual 
property standards, which was caused in part by underutilization of TRIPS
flexibility by all countries.254 The countries created the TRIPS Agreement 
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with the main purpose of uniting countries through consistent intellectual 
property standards, in the hope of making international trade easier. As it 
stands now, the application of Article 27 is sloppy and varies greatly from 
Member State to Member State. There is no evidence that any member has 
ever used Article 27.2 to refuse patenting based on grounds of environmental 
protection. 
As stewards of the Earth, humans have a unique position that comes with 
a duty to take care of the environment, protecting it for the next generation. 
Without a clear standard to follow, the protection of the environment becomes 
complicated and therefore seemingly less of a priority. The interpretation of
TRIPS Article 27.2 presented in this Article is necessary to stop the 
degradation of the environment by crops embedded with terminator 
technology, for the wellbeing of humans and our planet depends on it.
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